The title refers to Anselm's insight into the modal uniqueness of the divine existence and the proof based upon it in Proslogium III. Hartshorne continues his vigorous defense of "the Proof," his polemic against its critics, most of whom confuse it with the weaker one in Proslogium II, and his attempt to show that Anselm's discovery is ultimately viable only in the context of neo-classical theism. In the second half of the book a variety of responses to the proof, from (...) Gaunilo to several contemporaries, are examined and criticized. While this does not add substantially to the presentation and defense of the argument given in the first half, it does provide ample evidence of the way in which a host of philosophical questions are brought into sharp focus by reflecting on Anselm. Some of these, e.g., the theory of modalities, receive important attention which was lacking in The Logic of Perfection. The author's own position has not changed, though he now seems more impressed than previously by Barth's treatment of Anselm.—M. W. (shrink)

The forty-three selections in this volume, three-fourths of which are from twentieth century authors, come from every corner of the philosophical world. They are grouped in five divisions, corresponding to those in the companion volume by the same author, Religion and Judgment, each of which has a brief introduction and selected bibliography attached. The whole is constructed on the principles by which the author distinguishes philosophy of religion from religious philosophy, namely that religion can be treated generically in relation to (...) other human concerns and modes of existence, and that it can be treated non-theologically, i.e. independently of the assumption that belief in a god or gods is the essential feature of religion.—M. W. (shrink)

The major portion of the book is devoted to careful and detailed historical analysis of two traditions of theodicy in Christian theology, the Augustinian and the Irenaean. The latter, though foreshadowed by the second century Bishop of Lyons, was first fully developed by Schleiermacher. Both traditions are traced right up to the contemporary scene in English theology and systematically compared. The last five chapters are devoted to the author's own constructive theodicy which grows out of the Irenaean tradition. He finds (...) the ultimate solution to the problem of evil in a doctrine of universal salvation.—M. W. (shrink)

Included are eight essays by Collingwood from the period of 1921 to 1930, and introductory essay by the editor which adroitly summarizes the later views of The Idea of History and An Autobiography and discusses the relation of the early essays to them, and a bibliography of works by and about Collingwood, including a list of reviews of his books. One of the essays is a sympathetic critique of Croce, another a devastating attack on Spengler. The others discuss the nature (...) of historical-knowledge, its relation to scientific knowledge, the nature of philosophy of history, and such special problems as the theory of cycles and the idea of progress. On the whole, as the editor suggests, the relation to the later writings is that of continuity and anticipation.—M. W. (shrink)

Finally—a full length treatment of the Phenomenology of Mind in English. Its strengths and weaknesses stem from its not being a commentary. The author has set himself to the task of "capturing without its letter the spirit of the humanism pervading the Phenomenology." Avoiding the letter involves 1) the attempt to get free from Hegel's terminology, 2) the attempt to see the argument at the level of chapters rather than paragraphs or sentences, and 3) the complete abstraction from historical questions, (...) i.e., from questions about Hegel's life and times relevant to understanding the text. While the first two attempts are ably carried out and extremely instructive, the reader is often left with the frustrating need for the historical treatment of a commentary. The assumption "that the heart of Hegel's thought is to be found more in the method than in the results achieved by it..." is dubious, but it fortunately remains for the most part in the preface. The use of dialogue form in a quasi-commentary is as refreshing as it is unusual. The price of the book is unfortunate.—M. W. (shrink)

Herder's thought is presented as well advanced beyond his times, if often disorganized and confused. To contrast his ideas with those of more traditional eighteenth century political thought, the latter is described in terms of the mechanical models it embodies, while the organic and teleological categories of the former are stressed in discussing his answers to the questions of one and many, causation, motion, and power in their political contexts. As much attention is given to Herder's philosophies of history and (...) education as to his social and political thought in the usual sense, and the subtitle is distinctly misleading, since Herder's views on nationalism, involving the basic themes of self-determination and Volksgeist, are only one of many areas of thought presented to the reader. The book is lacking in any apparent embodiment of the organic unity which is one of its themes. A rather extensive bibliography is included.—M. W. (shrink)

A distinguished New Testament scholar turns his pen to the history of Israel. The result is a lucid and compact narrative, geared to the layman and student rather than the scholar. As the title suggests, the emphasis is on political rather than religious history. Much of this book's value will stem from its intentionally lopsided emphasis on the post-exilic period.--M. W.

This is a rambling and rather slow moving essay in metaphilosophy, though it is not so "meta" that the war in Vietnam does not get discussed. It embodies the broadest concept of philosophy's function and an unmitigated optimism in its capacities. Dogmatism, the chief obstacle to philosophic progress, is analyzed in terms of the interests and emotional motivations which underlie basic theoretical presuppositions. Its twofold cure involves the Spinozistic doctrine that the passions are best rendered meek by bringing them to (...) the light of consciousness, and the Hegelian doctrine that conflicting tendencies can only be harmonized by finding a larger context in which they become complementary. The illustration of this technique in the chapter on Eastern and Western philosophies, focusing on the concepts of reason and freedom, is the high point of the book, along with the chapter on ordinary language philosophy. The discussions of existentialism and Marxism are disappointing.—M. W. (shrink)

This is a commentary on the Aesthetic and Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason with frequent reference to the much neglected Methodology and a very brief discussion, in the final chapter, of the Dialectic. Dryer insists that the fundamental question of the Critique is how metaphysical judgments, i.e., judgments about how things are in general, can be verified; that it is neither a theory of knowledge or experience nor the exposition of a system of metaphysical principles except insofar as (...) such concerns are ancillary to the primary task; and that the literature on the first Critique, including Paton's and Kemp Smith's interpretations of it as a "metaphysic of experience," fails to understand Kant's argument by failing to accept Kant's description of his task. In the central chapter, "Verification in Geometry and Metaphysics," Dryer gives a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of verification in geometry and the way in which this is related to his final answer to the question of verification in metaphysics, with emphasis on imagination and the discussions of the Methodology. Chapters devoted to the First and Second Analogies and the Axioms of Intuition follow for the sake of illustration. The emphasis on verification and a large measure of freedom from Kantian terminology give the analyses a freshness which is only partially destroyed by the highly repetitious style. With minor exceptions Kant's arguments are defended throughout.—M. W. (shrink)

After a survey sketch of the development of analytic philosophy and its application to problems in philosophy of religion during the 1950's, Clarke argues that the non-descriptive functions of religious language depend on its descriptive functions and that the central problem of natural theology, upon which all revealed theology depends for its meaningfulness, is to show that the statement "There is a God" is both necessary and descriptive. To this end its first task is to provide a precise definite description (...) of God for which this may be done. His own suggestions are Hartshornean, carrying with them the explicit argument that traditional conceptions are not viable. In an interesting twist of a Kantian theme it is argued that the ontological argument depends for its success on the cosmological argument. The more general question of the possibility of metaphysics in the light of linguistic philosophy is treated in chapters devoted to the descriptive character of necessary statements and the logical requirements for setting up a metaphysical language. The chapter on the application of symbolic logic to natural theology might well have been included as an appendix, for its inclusion in the main text tends to fragment an essay which is already none too unified.—M. W. (shrink)

Mill's defense of the open society is interpreted as the means toward a closed one. Mill himself is treated as the apostle of cultural solidarity--hostile to Christianity and the clergy which once provided it, and a militant advocate of the Religion of Humanity. The interpretation is defended with some force, but the vehement critique of Mill's position is launched from a fideistic position so radical that its relativism undercuts not only Mill, but Cowling himself. Carelessness of organization and style fit (...) the author's misology only too well.--M. W. (shrink)

A volume of the Prentice-Hall "Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series," this is largely a second intentional discussion by way of anthology. The articles by Malcolm, Ryle, Austin and Cavell seek to explain and defend their own conceptions of philosophy, the latter in direct reply to Mates, whose article is a critique of the movement. The editor's brief introduction is excellent, and the selection of articles highlights nicely the differences of opinion among ordinary language philosophers, while pointing to the essential unity (...) of their thought and problems.--M. W. (shrink)

Selections from five books written since 1937 are combined with one journal article to form a debate. But, as the editor points out in his perceptive introduction, Plato has become more or less an occasion for discussing another issue--the theoretical foundations of democracy. Interestingly, the three against Plato are British--Crossman, Popper and Russell; the three for him are American--Wild, Hallowell and Strauss. The selections are non-technical, and together constitute a good introduction to an important aspect of political philosophy.--M. W.

One of the first volumes to appear in "The Princeton Series--Humanistic Scholarship in America," this book sustains a vigorous defense of religion as a proper field of study within the liberal arts curriculum. A comprehensive description of the present status of religious studies at undergraduate, seminary and graduate levels is combined with the attempt to raise and answer the numerous problems associated therewith. Candid and persuasive answers are given to such concrete questions as departmental vs. diffusionist structures, curriculum balance, and (...) the relation of religion to pre-theological training, but the touchy subjects of indoctrination and sectarian influence suffer from a lapse into generalities.--M. W. (shrink)

Religion in the generic sense is presented as an irreducible mode of human judgment. By emphasizing the generic character of religion Arnett sets himself against the "sectarians," those who would claim unique worth for a particular tradition. By arguing for the irreducible nature of religious judgment he opposes himself to the "secularists," those who would reduce religion to some other mode of judgment, or to a non-cognitive status. The strongest chapters are the third and fourth, which deal with the relation (...) of religion to morality and art, respectively. While vigorous arguments are presented against those who tend to identify religion with one or the other, e.g., Dewey and Santayana, the problems are not oversimplified, and careful attention is given to the affinities as well as the discontinuities involved. The discussion of religion and truth deals more with the generic value of religious judgment than with the question of the truth of particular religious judgments.—M. W. (shrink)

Contains extensive and uninterrupted selections from Plato, Aristotle, Butler, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, Ayer, and Toulmin. An introductory essay discusses agent morality vs. action morality, self-interest and benevolence, feeling and reason, rules and consequences, particular actions and general practices, and ethical absolutism vs. ethical relativism with reference, for the most part, to the selections which follow. The only disappointing selection is Plato's, which fails to contain any of Plato's own positive ethical theory.—M. W.

Christian secularism is here the equivalent of theistic naturalism. It is sharply distinguished both from the more radical secularism of Van Buren and the death of God theologians, and from the supernaturalism of traditional Christian views of history, which deny its autonomy by affirming special divine breakthroughs into it and a mode of human existence transcending it. The book is less a case for Christian secularism than an account of what it is, or rather, what it is not. Its three (...) divisions are entitled "Faith," "History," and "Secularism."—M. W. (shrink)

The first four chapters are devoted to an analysis of the network of problems falling under the "faith and history" rubric and to a restatement of Ernst Troeltsch's canons of historical methodology which is free from the dispute over metaphysical presuppositions. The attempt to achieve this by speaking of the morality of historical judgment instead of analyzing historical method is rendered radically ambiguous in that the ideals and duties of the new morality gain their content only by an overt appeal (...) to the same scientific world-view which rendered Troeltsch too metaphysical. The last four chapters are devoted to critique of twentieth century Protestant theologies in their attempts to come to grips with the historical revolution and to the author's own solution to the problem which is developed dialectically out of the positions he criticizes. These include dialectical theology, the so-called new quest of the historical Jesus, and positions which Harvey identifies as "hard" and "soft" perspectivism, attributing them to Alan Richardson and H. Richard Niebuhr.—M. W. (shrink)

An attempt to argue apodictically for the existence of a provident Creator in the spirit, but not the letter of Aquinas. Attempted proofs which depend on Platonic ontology, including Thomas' Fourth Way, are rejected outright, along with other considerations which are considered to have psychological, but not logical force, such as the widespread belief in God. Thomas' other four proofs, described as of the cosmological type, in distinction from the author's metaphysical proof, are criticized, not for being fallacious inferences, but (...) for being incomplete, that is, for proving the existence of something less than a provident Creator. The metaphysical proof which is offered seeks to overcome this defect by taking as its starting point, not the material world, but finite existence as such, and developing the antithesis between finite and absolute being. Two special features of the book are its extensive argument for the independence of metaphysics from all physical science, and its discussion of the problem of evil, which ultimately appeals beyond philosophical arguments to theological considerations.—M. W. (shrink)

While the methods and results of this classic work have been modified considerably by later Bultmannians, its translation now gives the English reader several opportunities: 1) To see "form criticism" at the spade-work level. 2) To judge the degree to which "form critical" results rest upon arguments from form alone. 3) To see in detail the historical skepticism which underlies the better known existential theology of the author. The supplement to the third edition. extends the original documentation of 1921.--M. W.

Never neglecting the theological psychology which underlies the Augustinian outlook, Deane interprets his political theory in terms of two conflicting tendencies. The dominant one is his "politics of imperfection" according to which the state has the negative functions of keeping peace and punishing overt evil. But there gradually emerges alongside it a theocratic view of the state according to which it can serve as an arm of the church in suppressing heresy. While noting that it was the latter aspect which (...) received more development in the Middle Ages, Deane suggests that the contemporary relevance of Augustine's theory is the realism which pervades the former. In the light of the scattered nature of Augustine's writing on political questions, the extensive quotation both in the text and in notes is quite useful.—M. W. (shrink)

The first five essays, including the title essay, are a stimulating contribution to contemporary discussion in philosophical theology. Their most striking feature is the attempted synthesis of Heideggerian-Bultmannian existentialism with Hartshorne's neo-classical metaphysics. Unlike Hartshorne, Ogden gives particular attention to the moral argument for God's reality, drawing heavily on the work of Stephen Toulmin, and engaging the atheism of Sartre and Camus in provocative fashion, in both the title essay and in "The Strange Witness of Unbelief." The final three essays (...) treat specifically Christian problems within the context of the philosophical framework previously developed—How is Jesus Christ God's unique and decisive act in history? What does it mean to call him Lord? What is the meaning of Christian eschatology? An explicit discussion of the relation between the theologian as philosopher and the theologian as Christian witness would have been helpful, since it is difficult to gather precisely what Ogden thinks of this relation by comparing the final three with the first five essays.—M. W. (shrink)

These posthumously published lectures are designed to sponsor a new root metaphor for reflection on Christian ethics. The familiar models of teleological ethics and deontological ethics are not abandoned, but a new one is added to meet their inadequacies. It is man-the-answerer, homo dialogicus, and in terms of the symbol the notion of a responsible self is delineated. That the new model lends itself more readily to phenomenology than to casuistry is wholly within the author's intention. A lengthy, but useful, (...) introduction by James Gustafson places these lectures in the broader context of Niebuhr's thought.--M. W. (shrink)

The first five essays, including the title essay, are a stimulating contribution to contemporary discussion in philosophical theology. Their most striking feature is the attempted synthesis of Heideggerian-Bultmannian existentialism with Hartshorne's neo-classical metaphysics. Unlike Hartshorne, Ogden gives particular attention to the moral argument for God's reality, drawing heavily on the work of Stephen Toulmin, and engaging the atheism of Sartre and Camus in provocative fashion, in both the title essay and in "The Strange Witness of Unbelief." The final three essays (...) treat specifically Christian problems within the context of the philosophical framework previously developed—How is Jesus Christ God's unique and decisive act in history? What does it mean to call him Lord? What is the meaning of Christian eschatology? An explicit discussion of the relation between the theologian as philosopher and the theologian as Christian witness would have been helpful, since it is difficult to gather precisely what Ogden thinks of this relation by comparing the final three with the first five essays.—M. W. (shrink)